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Vindictive Prosecution in Classical Athens: 
On Some Recent Theories 
Janek Kucharski 
To avoid the fatal charge of sycophantia, any one prosecuting a 
fellow-citizen for some public offence endeavoured to show that 
he had private and personal grounds of enmity against the ac-
cused; and if he succeeded in proving this it was considered the 
most natural and reasonable thing in the world that he should 
endeavour to satisfy his hatred by becoming public prosecutor. 
HIS QUOTATION from a Victorian, non-specialist 
treatise1 eloquently demonstrates that the issue in 
question is anything but new. Recently however, as 
sharp-edged discussions on the problem of the ‘otherness’ of 
Athenian law and society2 swept through the world of classical 
studies, it became one of the major theatres of war in the on-
going debate.3 Vindictiveness so unabashedly acknowledged by 
 
1 A. S. Wilkins, The Light of the World  2 (London 1870) 31. 
2 S. C. Todd, The Shape of Athenian Law (Oxford 1993) 29, “intense other-
ness” (cf. 64–70); V. Hunter, Policing Athens (Princeton 1994) 125–129; P. J. 
Rhodes, “Personal Enmity and Political Opposition in Athens,” G&R 43 
(1996) 21–30, at 24–25, and “Enmity in Fourth-Century Athens,” in P. 
Cartledge et al. (eds.), Kosmos. Essays in Order, Conflict and Community in Clas-
sical Athens (Cambridge 1998) 144–161, at 145–146. 
3 Closely related to this problem is the recent debate on the Athenian 
polis as a ‘stateless’ community with emphasis on the absence of the state’s 
monopoly on the use of force; cf. Hunter, Policing Athens 129–153; M. 
Berent, “Anthropology and the Classics: War, Violence, and the Stateless 
Polis,” CQ 50 (2000) 260 ff.; M. H. Hansen, “Was the Polis a State or a 
Stateless Society?” in T. H. Nielsen (ed.), Even More Studies in the Ancient Greek 
Polis (Stuttgart 2002) 17–47, at 32–37; G. Herman, Morality and Behaviour in 
Democratic Athens (Cambridge 2006) 216–257; E. M. Harris, “Who Enforced 
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the Athenian prosecutors served for one side as the crowning 
argument in representing classical Athens as a feuding society, 
one in which “the homicidal violence of the blood feud appears 
… to have been displaced into other arenas,” most importantly 
the lawcourts.4 For the other side it became a serious obstacle 
and embarrassment to the picture of a community which delib-
erately purged its punitive system of the spirit of vengeance, 
and in which the civic code of behavior in general demanded 
models of conduct radically opposite to those found in honor-
based, feuding societies.5 The present paper cannot hope to 
provide a full assessment of these two very different and mutu-
ally exclusive views. Both, however, are usually considered as 
extremes,6 delimiting thus a spectrum within which much 
room for discussion—perhaps of somewhat less holistic scope—
remains open.  
Insofar as the area of litigation is concerned, the scholarly 
consensus was not far removed from what is succinctly stated in 
the opening quotation.7 The last decade however, along with 
___ 
the Law in Classical Athens?” in E. Cantarella (ed.), Symposion 2005 
(Cologne/Vienna 2007) 159–176. 
4 D. Cohen, Law, Violence, and Community in Classical Athens (Cambridge 
1995) 84, on litigation as feud; cf. more recently F. McHardy, Revenge in 
Athenian Culture (London 2008) 94–99. 
5 Herman, Morality 201 (this book contains much of Herman’s earlier re-
search on the subject); cf. his critical review of Cohen, Law, Violence, in 
Gnomon 70 (1998) 605–615. Further bibliography on this view, n.9 below. 
6 Cf. R. Osborne, Athens and Athenian Democracy (Cambridge 2010) 200 
(“extreme”); L. Rubinstein, Litigation and Cooperation. Supporting Speakers in the 
Courts of Classical Athens (Stuttgart 2000) 178 (“most radical interpretations”: 
along with Cohen, however, she cites Osborne and Todd). See also Christ’s 
overall sympathetic review of Cohen’s Law, Violence, in BMCR 1996.6.12, 
and Osborne’s review in CR 47 (1997) 86–87. 
7 Cf. J. H. Lipsius, Das Attische Recht und Rechtsverfahren II (Leipzig 1908) 
238; J. O. Lofberg, Sycophancy in Athens (Menasha 1917) 21; R. J. Bonner and 
G. Smith, The Administration of Justice II (Chicago 1938) 41–42; K. J. Dover, 
Greek Popular Morality (London 1974) 182 ff.; for more recent assessments see 
Rhodes, in Kosmos 156 and esp. n.44; M. Christ, The Litigious Athenian (Balti-
more 1998) 155; D. Allen, The World of Prometheus. The Politics of Punishing in 
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some more balanced assessments,8 has seen a vigorous defense 
of a radically divergent position according to which motives 
such as enmity or revenge were generally out of place in the 
Athenian courts.9 Understandably, this has been approached 
with caution and reservations in more recent scholarship.10 
Given their importance to our understanding of the working of 
the Athenian legal system and civic ideology, however, the 
issues raised in the present controversy merit detailed scrutiny. 
To declare that a personal agenda is unsuitable for court is 
not, of course, to rule it out altogether. A personal wrong could 
be the very subject of prosecution, and not just the prosecutor’s 
personal motive. Such a lawsuit was in some cases procedurally 
___ 
Democratic Athens (Princeton 2000) 151–156; Cohen, Law, Violence 72 ff., 86–
118. 
8 M. Christ, “A Response to Harris,” in M. Gagarin and R. W. Wallace 
(eds.), Symposion 2001 (Cologne/Vienna 2005) 143–146, and his earlier 
Litigious Athenian (esp. 154–159); L. Rubinstein, “Differentiated Rhetorical 
Strategies in the Athenian Courts,” and D. Cohen, “Crime, Punishment, 
and the Rule of Law in Classical Athens,” in M. Gagarin and D. Cohen 
(eds.), Cambridge Companion to Ancient Greek Law (Cambridge 2005) 129–145 
(esp. 131–132) and 211–235 (these two studies cover more limited ground); 
D. Phillips, The Avengers of Blood. Homicide in the Athenian Law and Custom (Stutt-
gart 2008) 15–29 (whose scope, however, extends far beyond vindictive 
prosecution, discussed briefly at 19–20 and 23–24); most recently A. Alwine, 
The Rhetoric and Conceptualization of Enmity in Classical Athens (diss. Univ. of 
Florida 2010), as well as his forthcoming book on the same subject (I thank 
Dr. Alwine for granting me permission to refer to the typescripts of both). 
9 A. Kurihara, “Personal Enmity as a Motivation in Forensic Speeches,” 
CQ 53 (2003) 463–477; E. M. Harris, “Feuding or the Rule of Law? The 
Nature of Litigation in Classical Athens,” in Symposion 2001 125–141, esp. 
his criticism (133 n.23) of Christ’s response in the same volume; Harris, 
Democracy and the Rule of Law in Classical Athens (Cambridge 2006) 405–406 
(orig. in Dike 2 [1999]), 421–422 (“afterthoughts”). The quotation comes 
from Herman’s Morality (200–201), which is also to be counted among these 
studies (esp. 191–194, 276–277—with some divergent conclusions). 
10 Cf. Phillips, Avengers 20 n.14; D. M. MacDowell, Demosthenes the Orator 
(Oxford 2009) 170 n.58; S. C. Todd, A Commentary on Lysias, Speeches 1–11 
(Oxford 2007) 616 (on Lys. 9.10); Alwine, Rhetoric 78–79. 
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limited only to the aggrieved party, while in others it extended 
to any volunteer who enjoyed the required citizen rights (ho 
boulomenos Athēnaiōn hois exestin) and wished to act as a third-
party prosecutor on behalf of the victim. Of such altruistic 
prosecution, however, we hear next to nothing, and it seems a 
fair guess that for the most part cases of this kind were also 
taken to court by the wronged persons themselves.11 
Lawsuits open to volunteer prosecution are usually—follow-
ing the ancient practice—described as ‘public’ (dikai dēmosiai), 
while those available only to the victim or his closest kin, as 
‘private’ (dikai idiai). This distinction will be used in the dis-
cussion to follow. It should be kept in mind, however, that such 
phraseology runs the risk of inviting anachronistic presup-
positions related to modern categories of civil and criminal law, 
torts and crimes, etc., which do not always square well with 
Athenian practice—all the more in that in classical Athens the 
choice of procedure, public or private, was frequently a matter 
of considerable flexibility.12 In any event, as long as it was the 
aggrieved party who took upon himself the task of prosecuting 
for the wrongs suffered, such lawsuits were inherently bound 
up with personal motivation. 
There were, however, cases of wrongdoing with no particular 
individual victim, save the entire community at large. These 
too were brought to court by volunteers; in fact a majority of 
known public procedures dealt with wrongs of this kind.13 
 
11 Cf. Christ, Litigious Athenian 119–129; cf. Osborne, Athens 172 ff., 184–
190 (orig. in JHS 105 [1985]). Even in cases of eisangelia on behalf of 
orphans, third-party prosecutions are scantily attested: Is. 11; [Dem.] 
58.30–34; perhaps also the recently-discovered fragments of Hyperides’ 
Against Timandros, cf. D. Whitehead, “Hypereides’ Timandros: Observations 
and Suggestions,” BICS 52 (2009) 138–148 (suggesting, however, that the 
orphan himself was prosecutor). 
12 The locus classicus is Dem. 22.25 ff.; on a more specific level (dikē aikias 
vs. graphē hybreōs) this is brought out in Dem. 54.1. The standard work on 
the subject is Osborne, Athens 171–204 (with the recent endnote). 
13 A definite categorization, however, may not always be advisable; a 
public prosecution for impiety, for example, could be based on a charge of 
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Since the prosecutor here was not the victim of the offence, his 
action truly deserved the qualification ‘volunteer’, and he him-
self, as it may seem, selflessly undertook the task to act on be-
half of the polis. To be sure, some volunteers did also have 
their own personal accounts to be settled through such public 
lawsuits, but, as we have been recently advised, “one should 
not generalize from a few isolated cases.”14 
Norms and numbers 
There are in total thirty-one preserved (at least in con-
siderable amount) public prosecution speeches.15 Of these, five 
explicitly or implicitly deny any suggestions of personal en-
mity.16 This is a considerable figure, which does not necessarily 
merit the disregard shown it by some historians of Athenian 
law and society.17 On the other hand, however, the public 
___ 
cutting an olive stump (possibly Lys 7; cf. Osborne, Athens 196) or of per-
sonal assault during a festival (entertained in Dem. 21.51). 
14 Harris, in Symposion 2001 129; cf. Kurihara, CQ 53 (2003) 463–477; 
Harris seems to have significantly modified his earlier views, cf. his com-
ments on Aeschin. 1 in his Aeschines and Athenian Politics (Oxford 1995) 147. 
15 These are: Lys. 6, 12, 13, 14, 15, 22, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31; Dem. 19, 
20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, [26], [53], [58], [59]; Aeschin. 1, 3; Lyc. 1; Hyp. 1, 4 
(Jensen); Din. 1, 2, 3. Cf. Rubinstein, Litigation 179, and in Cambridge Com-
panion 133 n.10, who does not, however, take into account two Lysianic 
dokimasia ‘prosecutions’ (26, 31); though not dealing with a specific wrong 
and not followed by a penalty on conviction (cf. D. M. MacDowell, The Law 
in Classical Athens [London 1978] 168) this procedure was also open to any 
enfranchised volunteer (Ath.Pol. 55.4 with P. J. Rhodes, A Commentary on the 
Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia2 [Oxford 1993] 619). The authenticity of Dem. 
25 and [26] is a matter of scholarly debate; I follow here the recent assess-
ments of Rubinstein, Litigation 30–32, and MacDowell, Demosthenes 310–313, 
who consider both as genuine fourth-century forensic speeches, but deny 
the Demosthenic authorship of 26. 
16 Lys. 22.1, 31.2; Dem. 19.221, 23.1; Lyc. 1.5–6. It should be noted that 
Dem. 19.221 (personal enmity) is to some extent contradicted by 19.17 
(political enmity; see below); the incompletely preserved Lys. 26 on the 
other hand denies prosecuting as a favor to a friend (15). 
17 Cf. Allen, World of Prometheus 39–40, and “Changing the Authoritative 
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prosecutions where the speaker explicitly admits his personal, 
hostile involvement amount to eleven.18 Even if we take out the 
three cases related to individual wrongs,19 this still leaves us 
with eight acknowledged vindictive prosecution speeches as 
opposed to five where the litigant chose to present himself as a 
disinterested agent of the state. 
Furthermore, following Allen’s analysis, it should be pointed 
out that among the remaining twenty prosecutions which 
either deny personal agenda (five), or simply make no explicit 
mention of it (fifteen),20 six were delivered by appointed 
prosecutors,21 one is, by Athenian standards, an unusual 
prosecution of a law and not the man behind it (where the 
adversaries were a board of elected advocates with the original 
proposer among them),22 yet another was, in the speaker’s own 
___ 
Voice: Lycurgus’ Against Leocrates,” ClAnt 19 (2000) 12–13. 
18 Lys. 12, 13, 14.2, 15.12; Dem. 21; 22.1–4; 24.6–8 (the same enmity as 
in 22); [53].1–19; [58].1–4, 57–70; [59].1–16, 126; Aeschin. 1.1–3. Cf. 
Rubinstein, Litigation 179 and in Cambridge Companion 138. Dem. 25.37 men-
tions previous litigation (seven prosecutions by the defendant), which may 
imply personal enmity. 
19 Lys. 12, 13; Dem. 21; on the latter’s status as a genuine forensic piece 
in the light of Aeschin. 3.52 cf. Rubinstein, Litigation 208–209 (pro) and 
MacDowell, Demosthenes 246 (uncertain). 
20 Explicitly denied: n.16 above; not mentioned explicitly: Lys. 6, 26, 27, 
28, 29, 30; Dem. 20, 25, [26]; Aeschin. 3; Hyp. 1, 4; Din. 1, 2, 3; on Dem. 
25 see n.18 above. 
21 Dem. 25 (25.13), [26] (endeixis); Din. 1, 2, 3; Hyp. 1 (apophasis). On 
elected prosecutors and the relevant procedures (the standard one is 
apophasis) cf. Bonner and Smith, Administration II 357–362; MacDowell, Law 
61–62; Rubinstein, Litigation 111–122. Being an elected prosecutor does not 
preclude personal animosity (cf. Dem. 57.8, 63), but it may considerably 
affect the speaker’s rhetorical strategy, at least insofar as the representation 
of his motives is concerned; cf. Rubinstein, Litigation 196. On the endeixis of 
Aristogeiton see M. H. Hansen, Apagoge, Endeixis and Ephegesis (Odense 1976) 
141–142. 
22 Dem. 20 (graphē nomon mē epitēdeion theinai), cf. 20.146; see also 
MacDowell, Demosthenes 157. 
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words, “forced” upon him by external circumstances,23 three 
others, finally, are incompletely preserved, lacking the crucial 
proem, where the speakers habitually display their reasons for 
bringing the case.24 Their reliability in assessing the motiva-
tions of volunteer prosecutors is thus limited. This leaves us 
with only nine public prosecution speeches where personal 
enmity on the part of the speaker is without any doubt left 
unmentioned or explicitly denied,25 against eight where it is 
paraded.26 So much for the “few isolated cases.” 
This discussion of the figures and numeric proportions within 
the corpus of extant prosecution speeches (whose representative 
value as a whole is far from obvious) is enough to show that 
vindictive motivation stands out quite prominently among 
them, though far from appearing as a standard, let alone a 
required rhetorical strategy, as one might be led to assume e.g. 
on the basis of Lysias’ programmatic statement on prosecu-
torial enmity.27 But still it is a great embarrassment to the 
opposite view that public litigation in classical Athens remained 
untainted by the spirit of revenge—the view apparently en-
capsulated in Lycurgus’ claims to disinterestedness in his 
prosecution of Leocrates.28 Unless, of course, the surviving 
 
23 Lys. 22.1, “I am forced to prosecute” (ἠνάγκασµαι κατηγορεῖν). On 
the circumstances see below. 
24 Lys. 6, 26; Hyp. 4. On Lys. 26 see n.16 above. Lys. 27, 28, and 29 are 
labeled in the MSS. as epilogoi, which may either mean ‘peroration’ or 
‘supplementary speech’ (i.e. synēgoria), cf. S. C Todd, Lysias. Speeches (Austin 
2000) 281, 287. A recent and authoritative discussion of their status is given 
in Rubinstein, Litigation 27–28, 37–38; they too lack a developed proem, 
though the same may be said of Lys. 15 (not described as an epilogos), where 
enmity is nonetheless manifested in the brief peroration (12). 
25 Unmentioned: Lys. 27, 28, 29, 30; Aeschin. 3; denied: above, n.16. 
26 Lys. 14, 15; Dem. 22, 24, [53], [58], [59]; Aeschin. 1. 
27 Lys. 12.2; on such a reading see Cohen, Law, Violence 72 (his view of the 
topos of enmity, however, is much more nuanced, see n.93 below). Cf. 
Aeschin. 1.2. See also Allen, ClAnt 19 (2000) 15 (“standard ideological 
constraint requiring speakers to explain their enmity for the defendant”). 
28 Lyc. 1.5–6 (cf. Dem. 18.272–273); on such a reading see Kurihara, CQ 
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nine29 vindictive prosecution speeches are somehow proved to 
be abnormal, idiosyncratic, and therefore exceptions to the 
“normative expectation that public suits should not be moti-
vated by private enmity.”30 
Some exceptions 
Four among the nine were delivered by supporting speakers 
(synēgoroi), whose “relatively free position as συνήγοροι might 
have led speakers to expose their private enmity”31 in a manner 
allegedly unsuitable for the main prosecutors (hoi grapsamenoi). 
This is a fair argument insofar as it receives one-sided, positive 
support from the Rhetoric to Alexander, where the synēgoros is in-
deed advised to produce his personal agenda—either friendship 
with the co-speaker or hostility towards the defendant—among 
the plausible motives for joining in the lawsuit.32  
There are however three problems with this argument. First, 
by granting the synēgoros the privilege of vindictiveness, we are 
bound to acknowledge that it was, after all, not completely out 
of place in the Athenian courts, even if by virtue of his—
apparently—peripheral persona we were to take it as a motif of 
secondary importance or indeed exceptional.  
This, in turn, brings us to the second point. Traditionally 
synēgoria was considered a phenomenon relatively infrequent 
and at best collateral to the mainstream form of one-on-one 
prosecution. More recently, however, it has been clearly dem-
___ 
53 (2003) 468–469; Harris, Democracy 405; Herman, Morality 276–277. On 
Lycurgus see below. 
29 To avoid clumsiness, in the following section I will treat [Dem.] 59.1–
15 and 59.16–126 as separate speeches, both written by Apollodorus, but 
the first part delivered by his brother- and son-in-law Theomnestus (as the 
main prosecutor). 
30 Kurihara, CQ 53 (2003) 466; the following section will deal specifically 
with his assessments. 
31 Kurihara, CQ 53 (2003) 470; the speeches in question are: Lys. 14, 15; 
Dem. 22 and the second part of [Dem.] 59 (16–126). 
32 Rh.Al. 1442b13–16 (36.13); cf. the discussion in Rubinstein, Litigation 
125 ff. 
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onstrated by Rubinstein that, while far from usual, the practice 
of joint prosecution (and joint litigation in general) was in fact 
very common in the Athenian courts, and this especially in 
high-profile public lawsuits.33 And supporting speakers not 
infrequently acted as the de facto main litigants.34 Synēgoria 
therefore, itself little short of the norm, can hardly provide an 
explanation for transgressing the “normative expectations.”  
Third and most important, the synēgoros-argument still leaves 
us with five vindictive speeches delivered by main prosecutors. 
Their exceptional nature must be proven along different lines. 
It has been argued therefore that three of the remaining speak-
ers were idiōtai, private citizens—as opposed to professional 
politicians—to whom the “normative expectation on the 
private/public distinction in legal activities applied less de-
cisively.”35 As it stands, this claim is in need of additional 
 
33 See her meticulous discussion with numbers in Litigation 61–65. For a 
critical assessment of the traditional one-on-one model of Athenian liti-
gation (including the agonal, prestige-related model proposed in Cohen, 
Law, Violence) see Rubinstein 16–21; an attempt to reconcile it with the 
institution of synēgoria has been made in M. Christ’s review of Rubinstein, 
BMCR 2002.04.01. 
34 As did Apollodorus prosecuting Neaera ([Dem.] 59.16–126) or Demos-
thenes defending Ctesiphon (Dem. 18); see also Rubinstein, Litigation 133 ff. 
35 Kurihara, CQ 53 (2003) 475; the private citizen (idiōtēs)/politician 
(rhētōr, politeuomenos, symboulos) opposition is a relatively late concept which 
arguably emerged in the public discourse of Athens somewhere in the first 
half of the fourth century, cf. L. Rubinstein, “The Athenian Political Per-
ception of the Idiotes,” in Kosmos 125–143, at 127, 140–141. According to the 
letter of law, a rhētōr was any person who (voluntarily) addressed the Assem-
bly, the council, the lawgivers (nomothetai), or the courts, cf. M. H. Hansen, 
Eisangelia. The Sovereignty of the People’s Court (Odense 1975) 12 ff., and The 
Athenian Ecclesia II (Copenhagen 1989) 14 ff. In practice, however, even 
those who occasionally did take the rostrum were keen on presenting 
themselves as idiōtai, as opposed to the ‘regulars’ who made it their life; only 
the latter group therefore are considered politicians sensu stricto. It is also 
worth noting that when the term idiōtēs was opposed to the magistrates (who 
unlike the politicians exercised their political authority ex officio) it usually 
denoted any volunteer speaker of whatever socio-political status; cf. Rubin-
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support. Some corroboration of it may be tentatively deduced 
from Demosthenes’ vicarious defense of Ctesiphon (On the 
Crown), where it is stated that a “good and honest citizen” (kalos 
kagathos politēs), later identified as a “politician” (politeuomenos kai 
rhētōr), should not expect a jury convened on public matters to 
“secure the interests of his enmity (echthra) and anger (orgē).”36 A 
corresponding statement regarding the proper legal conduct of 
an idiōtēs is yet to be found. 
How and why is this supposed to save the normative ex-
pectation of the private/public distinction? Now, the usual as-
sumption was that public lawsuits in classical Athens were the 
exclusive domain of those who had the resources to undertake 
the risks of high-profile litigation as well as the skills and 
abilities to withstand the “terrors of the courtroom”: the po-
litical elite.37 An idiōtēs on the other hand, traditionally 
considered wanting in either or both, would seem a very rare 
specimen in the field of public lawsuits, indeed an exception. 
Yet again, however, Rubinstein has demonstrated that this 
model is far from self-evident. In the first place, the identity of 
many (public) prosecutors is simply unknown, and the names of 
many others are recorded only for the one case at hand: this 
does not prove that they were idiōtai, but it certainly does not 
prove that they were not.38 Furthermore, the assumed de facto 
___ 
stein 128 ff. 
36 Dem. 18.272; Christ (Litigious Athenian 158) speculates that the topos of 
the disinterested prosecutor may have been particularly popular among the 
‘politicians’.  
37 E.g. J. Ober, Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens (Princeton 1989) 113–
118; Christ, Litigious Athenian 32 ff.; Todd, in Kosmos 164; Allen, World of 
Prometheus 123 (“Only the strongest citizens would have been wise to under-
take a public case”). On the “terrors of the courtroom” see recently V. Bers, 
Genos Dikanikon. Amateur and Professional Speech in the Courtrooms of Classical Ath-
ens (Washington 2009) 44–68 (esp. 54–68). 
38 Rubinstein, Litigation 190–191. The catalogues in M. H. Hansen, The 
Sovereignty of the People’s Court (Odense 1974) 28–43, Eisangelia 69–111, Apagoge 
124–141, and Osborne, Athens 196–197, give over 60 unknown main 
prosecutors. Among those recorded only for one lawsuit there are: Lysitheos 
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exclusion of private persons from public lawsuits on account of 
their high risks and the terrors of the courtroom is not easily 
reconciled with the institution of synēgoria, joint litigation, which 
could and probably did pave the way for non-elite citizens to 
take part in public lawsuits, and even as main litigants (at least 
formally), when accompanied by wealthy and rhetorically 
skilled co-prosecutors.39 In consequence, the participation of a 
private person in a high-profile public lawsuit does not neces-
sarily render it in any way exceptional, in which case the entire 
idiōtēs-argument may, again, appear limited. 
Two other main prosecutors so far seem to have successfully 
made it through the sieve of the above exceptions: Aeschines 
and Diodorus.40 Their cases therefore require yet another ex-
planation. This time the argument would be that their conflict 
with their legal adversaries was too notorious for them to pre-
tend to be indifferent to personal matters. Now, to argue that 
public suits should not be motivated by private enmity except 
when they obviously were, may seem like playful sophistry. All 
the more since this is in fact far from being the case. For we do 
___ 
(PA 9399; Hansen, Athenian Ecclesia II 54; LGPN II s.v. 4); Pythangelos (PA 
12335; LGPN s.v. 1); Skaphon (PA 12724; LGPN s.v. 1; cf. Hansen, Apagoge 
139–140); Ariston (PA 2140; Hansen, Athenian Ecclesia II 38); Bathippos (PA 
2814; Hansen, Athenian Ecclesia II 39; LGPN s.v. 1); Apsephion (PA 2808; 
Hansen, Athenian Ecclesia II 39; LGPN s.v. 4); Lycinus (PA 9198; Hansen, 
Athenian Ecclesia II 53; LGPN s.v. 6); Phanostratus (PA 14097; Hansen, 
Athenian Ecclesia II 61; LGPN s.v. 7); Kallikrates (Hansen, Athenian Ecclesia II 
50; LGPN s.v. 13); Archestratides (PA 2395; Lys. 14.3; 15.12; not listed by 
Hansen; LGPN s.v. 2).  
39 Rubinstein, Litigation 91–92, 189–193; cf. Rhodes, in Kosmos 145; N. 
Fisher, “The Bad Boyfriend, the Flatterer and the Sykophant,” in I. Sluiter 
and R. Rosen (eds.), Kakos. Badness and Anti-Value in Classical Antiquity (Leiden 
2008) 185–231, at 213. 
40 Diodorus’ prosecution of Timocrates (Dem. 24) is the first one re-
corded where he acts as the main prosecutor. It is possible therefore that he 
was no ‘professional’ politician; cf. 24.6 which, though an obvious topos, for 
Kirchner is proof that he was a “homo in re publica parum versatus” (PA 
3919). 
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know of public lawsuits initiated out of flagrant and notorious 
hostility where the litigant nonetheless chose not to make an ex-
plicit display of it as his motive, as in Aeschines’ prosecution of 
Ctesiphon. We also know of defendants taking the time to refute 
their adversaries’ claims to enmity, which, true or not, ob-
viously must not have been notorious enough.41 And yet, 
apparently, the prosecutors did choose to make a display of it 
in order to gain further credibility, for why else would it be 
contested? Why refute such claims at all, if indeed personal, 
vindictive motivation on the part of the prosecutor was con-
sidered out of place in public lawsuits? 
Finally, one other main prosecutor—and quite probably a 
‘politician’ too—seems still happily indifferent to the stipulation 
that public suits should not be motivated by private enmity: 
Euctemon, the old foe of Androtion.42 To be sure, the speech 
he delivered as the main prosecutor has perished, but from the 
proem of his synēgoros Diodorus we may certainly infer that he 
too took time to recount his enmity towards the defendant:43 
As Euctemon, members of the jury, mistreated by Androtion, 
thinks it necessary both to assist the polis and to take revenge on 
behalf of himself (δίκην ὑπὲρ αὑτοῦ λαβεῖν), that I too shall at-
tempt, if only I am capable. 
Perhaps again Euctemon’s enmity towards Androtion was too 
notorious to be passed over in silence? Perhaps instead, we 
should revise the applicability of the normative expectation 
according to which public suits should not be motivated by 
 
41 Lys. 24.2; cf. [Dem.] 53.2. On the debated question of the authenticity 
of Lys. 24 see Todd, Lysias, Speeches 253–254 (in favour). 
42 In his catalogue Hansen, Athenian Ecclesia II 46, records one proposal 
delivered by Euctemon, admittedly after the prosecution of Androtion 
(Dem. 22); on Euctemon’s enmity see also MacDowell, Demosthenes 170. 
43 Dem. 22.1: ὅπερ Εὐκτήµων, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, παθὼν ὑπὸ Ἀν-
δροτίωνος κακῶς, ἅµα τῇ τε πόλει βοηθεῖν οἴεται δεῖν καὶ δίκην ὑπὲρ 
αὑτοῦ λαβεῖν, τοῦτο κἀγὼ πειράσοµαι ποιεῖν, ἐὰν ἄρα οἷός τε ὦ. Unless 
otherwise specified, translations are my own; quotations of Dem. are from 
the edition of Dilts (OCT). 
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private enmity. The exceptions, gradually heaped up upon one 
another, finally leave us with a very narrow space within which 
the alleged norm would operate: 1) active politicians, 2) main 
prosecutors, 3) with no history of previous conflict with the de-
fendant.44 Consideration of the extant public prosecution 
speeches shows that only a few meet such strict criteria, the 
majority being delivered by synēgoroi, idiōtai, old enemies of the 
defendants, or any combination of these.45 Survival, to be sure, 
should not be equated with representative value. As noted 
above, however, the participation of synēgoroi and idiōtai in 
public lawsuits was both frequent and firmly established on the 
ideological plane. What is thus left as specimens of the ‘norm’ 
are three speeches where pre-existing enmity is unambiguously 
ruled out by the speakers46 and perhaps five others where their 
status is unknown.47 
Political and personal quarrels 
What exactly are the vindictive litigants angry about when 
they explain their motives for taking their enemies to court? 
 
44 “Courtroom appearances had long-term effects on the politician’s 
career,” Ober, Mass and Elite 148. On the significance of gossip in the 
circulation of information about the Athenian elite (and not only) see Ober 
148–151; Hunter, Policing Athens 96–119. 
45 Prosecution speeches delivered by synēgoroi (including elected prosecu-
tors): Lys. 6, 14, 15, 27; Dem. 20, 22, [25], [26], [59].16–126; Hyp. 1, 4; 
Din. 1, 2, 3; (possibly) delivered by idiōtai acting as main prosecutors: Dem. 
24, [53], [58], [59].1–15; delivered by prosecutors with a history of enmity 
with the defendant or his party (acknowledged or not): Lys. 14, 15; Dem. 
19, 22, 24, 25, 53, 58, 59, Aeschin. 1, 3. 
46 Lys. 22, Dem. 23, Lyc. 1. 
47 Lys. 26, 28, 29, 30, 31; the Lysianic speeches of course precede the as-
sumed development of the ideological idiōtēs-rhētor opposition. The speaker 
of Lys. 26, though denying a (positive) personal agenda (26.15), may have 
been actually motivated by “sour grapes” going back to the previous doki-
masia of his own friend Leodamas (26.13–14; cf. Todd, Shape 287 and Lysias 
273). Lys. 28 and 29 according to some authorities were delivered by synēgo-
roi (or elected prosecutors); Rubinstein (Litigation 37–38) considers them 
uncertain in this respect. The speaker in Lys. 31 explicitly denies enmity. 
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Apollodorus had previously been prosecuted by Stephanus, 
Neaera’s husband, for proposing an illegal decree (graphē para-
nomōn). So was the father of Epichares, by Theocrines. Both 
lost their cases. Aeschines was to be prosecuted by Timarchus 
and Demosthenes at an audit (euthyna) on the charge of mis-
conduct on the embassy. Finally there is Diodorus, Euctemon’s 
team-mate, whose uncle was accused by Androtion of impiety 
(graphē asebeias)—yet another public prosecution.48 As noted by 
Rubinstein, all these cases, high-profile public lawsuits, are 
firmly rooted in the political sphere.49 This observation, how-
ever, led her and later Harris to conclude that “very few 
prosecutions resulted from private enmity,”50 which may be 
taken to suggest that in all other instances (as in those above) 
the enmity was rather political, or, in any case, at least safely 
removed from the sinister sphere of private vendetta (this point 
is of particular weight for Harris). 
Indeed, litigation in classical Athens may have been con-
sidered the “handmaiden of politics.”51 Debates over laws and 
policy were frequently taken from the Assembly to the courts 
by means of procedures specifically tailored to this end (graphē 
paranomōn, graphē nomon mē epitēdeion theinai, eisangelia),52 and 
 
48 [Dem.] 59.4–8; 58.1, 30 ff.; Aeschin. 1.2, 168, 174; Dem. 22.2, 24.7. 
Stephanus had also launched against Apollodorus a dikē phonou for the kill-
ing of a slave (probably); cf. C. Carey, Apollodoros Against Neaira (Warminster 
1992) 89; K. A. Kapparis, Apollodoros Against Neaira (Berlin 1999) 182–183. 
49 “Only three prosecutors state that their feelings of hostility originate 
from their dealings with the defendants outside the political sphere”: Litigation 
179. 
50 Harris, in Symposion 2001 129–130 (quoting Rubinstein); cf. Kurihara, 
CQ 53 (2003) 465 n.8: “Lene Rubinstein briefly remarks that enmities ex-
posed in public suits are mostly political.” 
51 Bonner and Smith, Administration II 43; cf. Rhodes, G&R 43 (1996) 11–
30. 
52 Owing to its widest applicability (and also greatest susceptibility to 
abuse) eisangelia was the least specific of these three (Hansen, Eisangelia 58–
65). Most graphai paranomōn had also limited explicit political import, since 
the indicted decrees were for the most part honorary ones (Hansen, Sov-
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many other lawsuits (public and private alike) could have been 
used simply to get rid of a political rival or cripple an opposing 
faction. Even the strictly political prosecutions, however, 
usually entailed severe penalties and repercussions for the 
defendants, such as heavy fines, disenfranchisement, exile, or 
capital punishment.53 Small wonder therefore that, as observed 
by Rhodes, in classical Athens political rivalry usually went 
hand in hand with personal animosities.54 It is quite con-
ceivable nowadays that politicians arguing bitterly in the par-
liament could still be friends on a less formal footing. Though 
such relationships cannot be entirely ruled out from the world 
of classical Athens,55 a case where one politician (as a volunteer 
prosecutor) quite literally wants the other’s head leaves little 
room for informal neutrality, let alone cordiality. Even if, as it 
is sometimes asserted, there was no history of previous personal 
conflict between such adversaries, the present lawsuit was 
bound to generate it.56 
Now, the public, ‘political’ prosecution of Diodorus’ uncle for 
impiety (graphē asebeias) was based on the charge of associating 
___ 
ereignty 62–65). See also J. Roisman, The Rhetoric of Conspiracy in Ancient Athens 
(Berkeley 2006) 95. 
53 Strictly speaking the only penalties attested in the known cases of graphē 
paranomōn / nomon mē epitēdeion theinai and eisangelia were fines and capital 
punishment (not attested for the former, but see n.74 below); these two, 
however, frequently led to either disenfranchisement (failure to discharge 
the fine, or three convictions in a graphē paranomōn) or self-imposed exile (in 
the face of a possible death sentence). See the catalogues in Hansen, Sov-
ereignty (28–43) and Eisangelia (66–120; cf. 35), also Todd, Shape 305–306. 
54 Rhodes, G&R 43 (1996) 21 (with the counter-example of modern pol-
iticians). 
55 Were we to believe Aeschines’ sentimental assertion (3.194), in the 
“Good Old Days” (so Rhodes, in Kosmos 157–158) even friends were bring-
ing each other to trial for transgressions against the polis; on the other hand 
Euthyphro’s plans to prosecute his father (even before the nature of the case 
is revealed) are seen as highly idiosyncratic (Pl. Euthphr. 4A; I owe this re-
mark to Professor Osborne). 
56 E.g. Dem. 19.221, 23.1; cf. Ar. Plut. 910 (see below). 
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with a polluted parricide—allegedly Diodorus himself. As such, 
this trial had little room for any overt political content (leaving 
aside the general and vague proviso that religion was inher-
ently bound up with the public life of the Athenian polis).57 
Whatever hidden political agenda Androtion may have had 
here, is also left in the dark. What is given prominence, on the 
other hand, are the very personal, indeed tragic repercussions 
of this—broadly speaking—political trial:58 
Who would have suffered greater misfortunes than I at his 
hands? What friend or guest-friend would have ever wanted to 
meet with me; which polis would have ever admitted someone 
believed to have committed so impious a crime? There is none. 
Turning to the prehistories of more overtly political liti-
gation, in search for a foothold for the thesis that very few 
prosecutions resulted from private enmity, we may start with 
the case Theomnestus vs. Neaera. The dispute of Apollodorus 
and Stephanus, as it is represented in the speech, originated in 
a graphē paranomōn launched by the latter. Apollodorus lost the 
case, though in the sentencing (timēsis) the jury did not side with 
the prosecutor, who had proposed a large fine of fifteen talents. 
The indicted decree provided for the Assembly to decide 
whether the surplus of the budget be used for military (stra-
tiōtika) or domestic (theōrika) purposes, whereas according to the 
existing law, in times of war it was to be the former by de-
fault.59 But the decree itself was apparently of little importance 
since its cancellation per se would not be “much of a bother”—
 
57 See Osborne, Athens 189–190, on the political agenda behind some 
known graphai asebeias; cf. however D. Cohen, Law, Sexuality, and Society. The 
Enforcement of Morals in Classical Athens (Cambridge 1991) 215; Todd, Shape 
308 ff. 
58 τίς ἂν ἀθλιώτερα ἐµοῦ πεπονθὼς ἦν ὑπὸ τούτου; τίς γὰρ ἂν φίλος ἢ 
ξένος εἰς ταὐτό ποτ᾿ ἐλθεῖν ἠθέλησεν ἐµοί; τίς δ᾿ ἂν εἴασε πόλις που 
παρ᾿ ἑαυτῇ γενέσθαι τὸν τὸ τοιοῦτο ἀσέβηµα δοκοῦντα εἰργάσθαι; οὐκ 
ἔστιν οὐδὲ µία (Dem. 22.2; cf. 24.7). 
59 [Dem.] 59.3–6; see Hansen, Sovereignty 34; Carey, Apollodoros 6–7; Kap-
paris, Apollodoros 174–178. 
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says Theomnestus. The worst was yet to come—if only Steph-
anus had it his way in the sentencing: disenfranchisement and 
“ultimate poverty.” “What shame and indeed misfortune 
would not have befallen me?” asks the prosecutor.60 This, and 
not the differences between the stratiotic money and the 
theoric, is given as his motive for prosecution. 
The ‘political’ quarrel between Epichares and Theocrines 
also had its origins in a graphē paranomōn launched by the latter 
against the former’s father. The indicted decree, a motion hon-
oring one Charidemus,61 was attacked as in fact detrimental to 
his interests. Theocrines won the day with a double victory: not 
only did he secure the defendant’s conviction, but he also 
managed to persuade the jury to a heavy fine of ten talents. 
Unable to discharge it, Epichares’ father was registered as a 
state-debtor and disenfranchised. According to the speaker, the 
prosecution was, of course, a sham, and Theocrines was ready 
to drop it for a thousand drachmas, which the defendant was, 
unfortunately, unable to pay. Yet again, however, in the pro-
logue Epichares chooses to secure the sympathy of the jury not 
by arguing how wrong—and, perhaps, harmful or at least inex-
pedient to Charidemus—was the lawsuit cancelling his father’s 
decree, but by pointing to the very personal consequences of 
this (broadly speaking) political trial: to his father’s misfortunes 
as a result of the disenfranchisement, which was to be inherited 
by himself.62 
Now, it may well be that at least some of these legal quarrels 
did have a political agenda as well.63 The fact nonetheless re-
mains that what is given emphasis here are only the possible or 
 
60 [Dem.] 59.6, τὴν ἐσχάτην ἀπορίαν; the decree: 59.11. Theomnestus, 
of course, would have been affected only indirectly by Apollodorus’ (hypo-
thetical) plight. 
61 PA 15374 and 15376; LGPN II s.v. 23; not to be identified with the 
beneficiary of Aristocrates’ indicted decree (in Dem. 23; PA 15380). 
62 Theocrines’ case: [Dem.] 58.30–33; misfortunes of the speaker: 58.1. 
63 For the political dimension of the quarrel between Stephanus and 
Apollodorus see Carey, Apollodoros 6 ff.; Kapparis, Apollodoros 183–184. 
184 VINDICTIVE PROSECUTION IN CLASSICAL ATHENS 
 
————— 
Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 52 (2012) 167–197 
 
 
 
 
actual repercussions of these (broadly speaking) political trials: 
personal repercussions. For being publicly labeled a parricide 
with all its legal, social, and religious implications (as with 
Diodorus), being disenfranchised (like Epichares’ father and, 
hypothetically, Apollodorus), or simply losing a considerable 
amount of money (Apollodorus and Euctemon) is no political 
matter, even if the fons et origo of the quarrel did fall under such 
a category. Most revealing here is the quarrel between Aes-
chines and Timarchus. Hardly any other trial could be more 
overtly political than the former’s (pending) prosecution at his 
audit on the charge of misconduct on the embassy to Philip. 
And yet even here the whole case is curtly dismissed with a 
vague but revealing phrase: “I myself have been personally (idiai) 
harassed with sycophantic prosecutions”—by Timarchus. The 
latter’s multiple transgressions against the polis are strictly 
opposed to this ‘private’ quarrel, whereas the political issue of 
the audit itself is given surprisingly little attention.64 
Priorities and premises 
In another recent and highly eulogistic account of Athenian 
social and legal history, which seeks to prove that motives such 
as enmity or revenge were generally out of place in a city such 
as Athens, a somewhat different attempt is made to square with 
the embarrassing evidence of vindictive prosecutions. The most 
notorious lawsuit in this respect (along with some other 
speeches) is explained away as follows: 
The speakers are at pains to point out that they have brought 
this case only as a last resort … and that any interest in private 
vengeance that they may feel is secondary to their deep concern 
for public welfare … By the speech’s concluding paragraph the 
idea of private vengeance has vanished altogether and the 
dikasts are being told that it is their duty to avenge not Theo-
 
64 “Seeing that the polis is harmed … and myself being personally 
harassed by sycophantic prosecutions” (ὁρῶν δὲ τὴν πόλιν µεγάλα βλαπ-
τοµένην … καὶ αὐτὸς ἰδίᾳ συκοφαντούµενος: Aeschin. 1.1); the embassy 
to Philip and the audit are briefly mentioned at 1.168, 174. 
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mnestus and Apollodorus, but the gods and themselves.65 
I have no misgivings about taking justice as the highest-
scoring motive in the public discourse of classical Athens—a 
motive so noble indeed as to be of itself too good to be true. 
For the only volunteer prosecutor who does indeed live up to 
this ideal of pure and disinterested litigation is found in 
Aristophanes. A “patriot” (philopolis) “like no other man,” 
“attentive to the matters of state” (ta tēs poleōs), tasking himself 
“to act for its benefit,” “to protect its laws,” and “not to let 
wrongdoings go unpunished”—the Sycophant.66 All this of 
course may seem no more than a façade, beneath which false 
accusations and, perhaps, sinister pecuniary motives are lurk-
ing. But this is not the point in the Plutus. Neither the legal 
merits of the Sycophant’s actions nor even his possible hidden 
agenda (money) are given any attention. The point is that he is 
a meddler, someone eager to take people to court over affairs 
which are none of his business, regardless of the accusations’ 
validity.67 “How can you be a good citizen, you thug (ō 
 
65 Herman, Morality 193, referring to [Dem.] 59. This is not exactly the 
case: in the concluding paragraph (59.126) we read: ἐγὼ µὲν οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες 
δικασταί, καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς, εἰς οὓς οὗτοι ἠσεβήκασιν, καὶ ἐµαυτῷ τιµω-
ρῶν, κατέστησά τε τουτουσὶ εἰς ἀγῶνα. The idea of private revenge is 
therefore far from vanished altogether; along similar lines Herman reads the 
proem of Lys. 14.1–2. Cf. Kurihara, CQ 53 (2003) 471 (on Dem. 24), “the 
ongoing hostility is presented as if it were a secondary reason.” 
66 Ar. Plut. 901–925; cf. [Dem.] 58.63–64. See Bonner and Smith, Ad-
ministration II 44; MacDowell, Law 63 ff.; Christ, Litigious Athenian 146–147, 
and “Imagining Bad Citizenship in Classical Athens: Aristophanes’ Ecclesia-
zusae 730–876,” in Kakos 169–183, at 173–174; M. H. Hansen, The Athenian 
Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes (Norman 1999) 195. 
67 The keyword here is πολυπραγµοσύνη (or φιλοπραγµοσύνη) for 
which (in the context of the courts) see V. Ehrenberg, “Polypragmosyne: A 
Study in Greek Politics,” JHS 67 (1947) 54–55, 59; A. W. H. Adkins, 
“Polupragmosyne and ‘Minding One’s Own Business’: A Study in Greek 
Social and Political Values,” CP 71 (1976) 308–311, 316 ff. (“to prosecute, 
not out of enmity … but out of public-spiritedness or a desire for reward, 
whether the accusation was false or true, was … to ‘do many things,’ ” 318); 
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toichōryche), if you make enemies (apechthanei) in what concerns 
you naught?”68 For even the best case, a patent instance of 
wrongdoing brought to court, could nonetheless appear as 
sycophantic prosecution. This is most clearly stated in the 
Lysianic speech Against the Grain Dealers:69 
Many people, men of the jury, have approached me surprised at 
the fact that I was prosecuting the grain-dealers before the 
Council; they said that, even though you are certain that they 
had committed a crime, you nonetheless consider all those who 
engage in this case as sycophants.  
The speaker, to be sure, explicitly denies any pre-existing 
enmity. To call his prosecution disinterested, however, would 
be mistaken. For he too has pressing personal concerns which 
he seeks to address by bringing in the case at hand. He had 
previously opposed the Council’s motion to execute the grain 
dealers without trial, which led to suspicions and slanders that 
he was, in fact, working in concert with them and attempting 
thus to save them. To prove these allegations false, therefore, 
he considered himself “forced” (ἠνάγκασµαι κατηγορεῖν αὐ-
τῶν) to move on with the lawsuit. 
An examination of other prosecution speeches, where enmity 
towards the defendant is explicitly denied, reveals that, with 
one notable exception, the litigants seem curiously reluctant to 
produce their concern for justice and law as a motive on its 
own.70 The speaker prosecuting Philon (during the latter’s scru-
___ 
L. B Carter, The Quiet Athenian (Oxford 1986) 83–87; Osborne, Athens 217; 
Rubinstein, Litigation 199 (“litigious hyper-activity”). 
68 Ar. Plut. 909; though quite specific in the legal sense (‘a burglar digging 
through the wall’), τοιχωρύχος here and elsewhere in Aristophanes is used 
as a “highly general term of opprobrium”: K. J. Dover, Aristophanes Clouds 
(Oxford 1968) 249. 
69 Lys. 22.1: πολλοί µοι προσεληλύθασιν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, θαυ-
µάζοντες ὅτι ἐγὼ τῶν σιτοπωλῶν ἐν τῇ βουλῇ κατηγόρουν, καὶ λέγοντες 
ὅτι ὑµεῖς, εἰ ὡς µάλιστα αὐτοὺς ἀδικεῖν ἡγεῖσθε, οὐδὲν ἧττον καὶ τοὺς 
περὶ τούτων ποιουµένους λόγους συκοφαντεῖν νοµίζετε. 
70 On the mistrust of purely public-spirited prosecutions see Hansen, 
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tiny as a prospective councilor) refers to the bouleutic oath, 
which he, himself a member of the council, has taken, and 
which obliges him (he is keen to stress) to prevent anyone unfit 
for this office from undertaking it.71 In the prosecution of 
Aristocrates, the speaker, as if recycling the anxieties voiced in 
the Plutus, admits that he is likely to incur the defendant’s en-
mity (apechtheia), but argues that the decree is not just contrary 
to the law, or that Charidemus is unworthy of the honors be-
stowed thus upon him:72 according to him, the indicted motion 
is in the first place inexpedient as it jeopardizes the Athenian 
presence in the Chersonese.73 And despite Euthycles’ common-
place assertion that he is no politician (politeuomenos), he seems 
to have been actively involved in these particular matters in the 
past, and working in tandem with Demosthenes, his present 
logographer. The whole case becomes thus a clear-cut speci-
men of a truly political debate taken to the courts, where the 
___ 
Democracy 195; Rubinstein, Litigation 197; Allen, ClAnt 19 (2000) 16. 
71 Lys. 31.1–2: “Given the extent of his audacity and the fact that I have 
sworn an oath when I came to the office … putting my confidence in the 
multitude of his crimes and honoring the oaths which I have sworn.” Cf. 
Christ, Litigious Athenian 152. M. Weissenberger, Die Dokimasiereden des Lysias 
(Frankfurt am Main 1987) 157, argues that denying personal involvement 
was “unbedingt notwendig” in dokimasia suits, which however was clearly 
not the case for the prosecutor of the eponymous disabled man of Lysias’ 
defense speech (Lys. 24.2). 
72 Dem. 23.22–99 and 144–195 respectively; cf. T. L. Papillon, Rhetorical 
Studies in the Aristocratea of Demosthenes (New York 1998) 14–19, who takes 
them as the judicial and epideictic elements of the speech (I owe this refer-
ence to Dr. Alwine). 
73 Dem. 23.1–17 (esp. 8–12), 100–143. These were the chief strands of 
argument of prosecutions in graphai paranomōn (those related to honorary 
decrees comprising two-thirds of the known cases: Hansen, Sovereignty 62 ff.), 
most succinctly stated in Dem. 23.18; cf. H. Yunis, “Law, Politics, and the 
Graphe Paranomon in Fourth-Century Athens,” GRBS 28 (1988) 361–382, at 
368–373. Of these, however, (in)expediency may well have been the most 
weighty (Yunis 376 ff.); on the alleged inexpediency of Aristocrates’ decree 
and its historical background see Roisman, Rhetoric of Conspiracy 101–102, 
165 ff. 
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issue at stake is not just punishing the wrongdoer, but prevent-
ing a course (allegedly) detrimental to Athens’ foreign policy.74 
In any case, Euthycles (and Demosthenes) may have had good 
reasons to believe that they were above suspicion of frivolous 
meddlesomeness. More personal (though not expressly vindic-
tive) was Demosthenes’ prosecution of Aeschines on the charge 
of misconduct on the embassy to Philip. His concern for justice 
is indeed given the place of honor there. He does, however, 
sincerely acknowledge another motive, one slightly more down-
to-earth: that he himself, a member of the embassy, was also 
implicated in its failure and in the adverse political turn which 
followed it—that, in other words, it may also become his lia-
bility, which he therefore seeks to forestall, by prosecuting the 
true villain.75 Whatever his real agenda, no-one could possibly 
suspect that this matter “concerns him naught.” 
The only speaker who boldly defies the suspicions voiced in 
Aristophanes’ Plutus is the austere and upright Lycurgus. Even 
he acknowledges that his lawsuit may be open to allegations of 
sycophancy,76 but this does not hinder him from parading his 
own disinterestedness and even making an example of it. The 
manner in which his truly public-spirited concern for justice is 
voiced may, however, reveal more than our expectations would 
 
74 Dem. 23.188–189; cf. Papillon, Rhetorical Studies 24. Hansen, Sovereignty 
33, tentatively suggests that the prosecution was to demand the death 
penalty, but this is far from certain; on Euthycles’ possible personal involve-
ment in the case see Rhodes, in Kosmos 156; Todd, in Kosmos 162 n.3. 
75 Dem. 19.223–224. A moment earlier (221), however, he distances him-
self from a similar motive imputed to him by his adversaries: “he believes 
his opponents to be guilty and wants to avoid being dragged down with 
them” (D. M. MacDowell, Demosthenes. On the False Embassy [Oxford 2000] 
295; cf. Christ, Litigious Athenian 153).  
76 Lyc. 1.31, cf. 1.3. A thorough analysis of Lycurgus’ disinterested 
rhetoric is given by Allen, ClAnt 19 (2000) 5–33 (though she may somewhat 
overstate the case for vindictive prosecution as the normative strategy). 
Alwine (Rhetoric 72, and more extensively in his forthcoming book) points 
out well that Lycurgus’ high profile as a leading politician may to some ex-
tent have shielded him from suspicions of sycophantic motivation. 
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allow:77 
For it does not become a just citizen to put on public trials those 
who have done the polis nothing wrong on account of private 
enmity (ἰδίας ἔχθρας), but to consider all those who transgress 
against our country to be his own personal enemies (ἰδίους ἐχ-
θρούς). 
It has been observeded that the rhetoric of this professed 
indifference to personal matters displays notable similarities to 
the argument that opens the first Lysianic prosecution of Al-
cibiades the Younger78—a prosecution, however, very different 
in spirit, in which enmity, far from being denied, is explicitly 
acknowledged, indeed paraded:79 
I believe, members of the jury, that you have no need to hear 
any statement of motive from those who are volunteering to 
prosecute Alcibiades. From the beginning he proved himself to 
be a citizen of such sort, that even if one happens not to be per-
sonally (ἰδίαι) wronged by him, one should nonetheless consider 
him a personal enemy (ἐχθρόν) on account of his conduct in 
other matters. 
These similarities extend beyond that which is stated plainly to 
that which is understood. Lysias’ rhetoric makes use of the 
following enthymeme: 1) you need not hear of the prosecutor’s 
motivation (conclusion); 2) because everyone should be the de-
fendant’s enemy (minor premise). The implied major premise, 
voiced explicitly just a moment later, is: 3) normally the 
prosecutor should be the defendant’s enemy. Compare now the 
 
77 Lyc. 1.6: πολίτου γάρ ἐστι δικαίου, µὴ διὰ τὰς ἰδίας ἔχθρας εἰς τὰς 
κοινὰς κρίσεις καθιαστάναι τοὺς τὴν πόλιν µηδὲν ἀδικοῦντας, ἀλλὰ 
τοὺς εἰς τὴν πατρίδα τι παρανοµοῦντας ἰδίους ἐχθροὺς εἶναι νοµίζειν. 
78 Allen, ClAnt 19 (2000) 14–15; cf. C. Carey, Lysias. Selected Speeches (Cam-
bridge 1989) 150. 
79 Lys. 14.1: ἡγοῦµαι µέν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, οὐδεµίαν ὑµᾶς ποθεῖν 
ἀκοῦσαι πρόφασιν παρὰ τῶν βουλοµένων Ἀλκιβιάδου κατηγορεῖν· τοι-
οῦτον γὰρ πολίτην ἑαυτὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς παρέσχεν ὥστε καὶ εἰ µή τις ἰδίᾳ 
ἀδικούµενος ὑπ᾿ αὐτοῦ τυγχάνει, οὐδὲν ἧττον προσήκει ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων 
ἐπιτηδευµάτων ἐχθρὸν αὐτὸν ἡγεῖσθαι. 
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train of thought in Lycurgus’ argument: 1) I am not prosecut-
ing out of enmity (conclusion); 2) because everyone should be 
the defendant’s personal enemy (minor premise). The implied 
major premise remains the same. To be sure, Lycurgus does 
later explicitly condemn vindictive prosecution in general, but 
with an important qualification: bringing in false charges for the 
sake of enmity. His professed public-spiritedness therefore rests 
not on rejecting revenge on principle, but on its rhetorical 
transposition from the individual prosecutor to the entire com-
munity, on whose behalf the former may now act as a dis-
interested agent.80 
Patriotic revenge and vindictive sycophancy 
For revenge, it has been traditionally argued (as in the 
opening quotation), effectively dispels suspicions as to the 
prosecutor’s motivation. If he means to harm his enemy, he is 
no sycophant.81 “I am not acting as a sycophant, but because I 
have been wronged (adikoumenos) and insulted (hybrizomenos), and 
now I intend to take revenge (timōreisthai),” insists bluntly 
Apollodorus in the very first words of his prosecution of Ni-
costratus.82 Now, it has been traditionally understood that the 
term ‘sycophant’ denoted a very particular sort of villain, one 
exploiting the institution of volunteer prosecution for the sake 
of financial gain, sought either through blackmail, litigation for 
a fee, or money awarded to successful prosecutors in some 
particular procedures. Since these could hardly be advanced as 
respectable motives for prosecution, ‘professional’ sycophants 
usually had the appearance of righteous and patriotic busy-
 
80 Cf. R. J. Bonner’s revealing if inadvertent choice of words: “a new turn 
to a common sentiment”: Lawyers and Litigants in Ancient Athens (Chicago 
1927) 62.  
81 See n.7 above for an overview of the scholarly consensus on this point. 
82 [Dem.] 53.1; cf. 59.1; Lys. 7.20 (Kurihara’s suggestion, CQ 53 [2003] 
467, that this “cannot be taken as a comment condoning private enmity in 
so far as it appears alongside ‘sycophancy’ ” is mistaken); Lys. 24.2; Lys. 6.31 
is less decisive. 
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bodies.83 
The only professional sycophant, however, was probably to 
be found on the comic stage.84 For in classical Athens syco-
phancy was not necessarily a career, but in the first place a 
term of abuse on which a fuzzily-defined social and rhetorical 
construct has been erected, that of the perverted Doppelganger 
of the good citizen-prosecutor. The famous “workshop of 
sycophants” (ergastērion sykophantōn) was not an actual Athenian 
law office but rather a figure of invective.85 Money-grubbing 
may still have been one of the more obvious traits of the ‘syco-
phant’,86 but neither the only one nor even the mandatory 
 
83 Lofberg, Sycophancy 26–59; Bonner and Smith, Administration II 44–54, 
“legitimate financial gain” (41), i.e. rewards for successful prosecution per-
haps could sometimes be produced as a good motive; cf. [Dem.] 58.13 and 
Christ, Litigious Athenian 142. Patriotic busybodies: Dem. 58.34 (ταῦτα γὰρ 
οἱ πάντα πωλοῦντες λέγειν εἰθισµένοι εἰσίν), 63–64; cf. D. Harvey, “The 
Sycophant and Sycophancy: Vexatious Redefinition?” in P. Cartledge et al. 
(eds.), Nomos. Essays in Athenian Law, Politics and Society (Cambridge 1990) 
103–121, at 114; Christ 147; Yunis, GRBS 28 (1988) 379–380. 
84 Osborne, Athens 216–217; Christ, Litigious Athenian 59–67 and in Kakos 
170–174; Rubinstein, Litigation 198 ff.; contra: Harvey, in Nomos 114 ff. (but 
see Christ 67). 
85 Cf. [Dem.] 39.2, 40.9. Actual ‘bureau’ or ‘club’: Lofberg, Sycophancy 
60–68; cf. Bonner and Smith, Administration II 54 (cautiously); not real: 
Osborne, Athens 217 n.42. 
86 The traditional triad, prosecuting for a fee, rewards, and blackmail, is 
given emphasis by Harvey (in Nomos 111 ff.), and criticized Osborne (Athens 
209–213), who points out the weaknesses of the latter two (few procedures 
offering rewards; few references to sycophantic blackmail). Rubinstein (Liti-
gation 201 ff.) points to other possibilities of ‘sycophantic’ money-making in 
the context of synēgoria: acting as a ‘straw’ grapsamenos and deserting or 
sabotaging a team-based prosecution for cash—all the while denying the 
significance of prosecuting for rewards and blackmail. To the latter the 
recent debate on the criminalization of withdrawing public prosecutions is 
highly relevant, cf. Harris, Democracy 408–418, 421–422; R. Wallace, “With-
drawing Graphai in Ancient Athens – A Case Study in ‘Sycophancy’ and 
Legal Idiosyncrasies,” in E. Cantarella et al. (eds.), Symposion 2003 (Co-
logne/Vienna) 57–66, with Harris’s response at 67–72;. 
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one.87 Revenge therefore might have seemed incompatible 
with some features of this Protean monster, but not necessarily 
with all. And indeed in some rhetorical arguments the ‘syco-
phant’ and the vindictive prosecutor appear to be working 
hand in hand.88 In others, furthermore, allegations of syco-
phancy are thrown at the speaker’s adversaries indiscriminately 
alongside suggestions that they are motivated by enmity.89 Even 
vindictive prosecution therefore—whether or not explicitly 
acknowledged as such by the prosecutor himself—could be 
‘sycophantized’. 
Such ignoble enmity as it is constructed in the extant 
speeches—prosecution and defense alike—has its distinctive 
characteristics. It is coupled with envy and spite, whereas 
‘good’ forensic revenge is fuelled by sincere indignation at one’s 
personal grievances and the defendant’s public transgressions.90 
It is incommensurate with the wrongs suffered by the prosecu-
tor, who thus proves to be a pest causing both the defendant 
and the jury unnecessary trouble on account of his petty over-
 
87 A systematic list is given by Harvey (in Nomos 112 ff.): false charges, 
sophistical quibbling, slander, overlitigiousness, and raking up old charges; 
the first four are given emphasis by Osborne (Athens 207–217) at the expense 
of the pecuniary side of sycophancy. 
88 E.g. Lys. 7.1, 30, 38–39; Andoc. 1.104; Dem. 23.190; Dem. 57.57—
probably a private lawsuit (ephesis), cf. Rubinstein, Litigation 61–62 n.99, and 
MacDowell, Demosthenes 288 n.4; contra Hansen, Apagoge 64 n.26 (graphē 
xenias). 
89 E.g. Lys. 19.2, 64 (enemies), 9 (sycophants); 21.17 (both); Dem. 18.123 
ff. (enemy), 242, 266 (sycophant); Aeschin. 2.5 (both); cf. Lys. 3.44 (syco-
phant); 4.13 (enemy), 14 (sycophant)—probably public lawsuits, see D. Phil-
lips, “Trauma ek pronoias in Athenian Law,” JHS 127 (2007) 74–105; Dem. 
57.34 (sycophant), 61 (hereditary enemy) 50 (both). Similar conclusions (on 
the basis of Dem. 57) have been reached by Alwine in his forthcoming book 
(ch. 3). 
90 Envy and spite: Dem. 18.279, 121, 315; 23.188; Aeschin. 2.22, 139. Cf. 
D. Cairns, “The Politics of Envy: Envy and Equality in Ancient Greece,” in 
D. Konstan and K. Rutter (eds.), Envy, Spite, and Jealousy: The Rivalrous Emo-
tions in Ancient Greece (Edinburgh 2003) 235–252. ‘Proper’ enmity contrasted 
with envy: Lys. 24.1 ff.; cf. Cohen, Law, Violence 81 ff. 
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sensitivity (indeed meddlesomeness); a ‘proper’ vindictive law-
suit, on the other hand, is launched only in the face of truly 
heinous, hubristic injuries, testimony to which is also the fact 
that the speaker has endured repeated provocations or that the 
present court vengeance has been urged upon him by others.91 
It is finally selfish and not infrequently contrary to the interests 
of the people, whereas respectable enmity always serves the 
common good.92 These are of course nothing more than rhe-
torical phenomena; an actual prosecution launched for the sake 
of revenge could be constructed either way by either side, de-
pending on their choice of forensic strategy (and of course the 
factors determining such choice).93 
An area in which the figures of the sycophant and the (bad) 
vindictive litigant may have been seen to cooperate most 
harmoniously was the baseless prosecution—a rhetorical, con-
ceptual area, to be sure. According to Osborne, this in fact was 
the defining trait of the Athenian sycophant.94 He who wanted 
revenge, on the other hand, may well have been above petty 
money-grubbing,95 but he was also likely to trump up false 
accusations in order to make the life of his enemy at least a 
little harder.96 If the defense managed to persuade the jury of 
 
91 Incommensurate: Lys. 9.15; Dem. 18.277; pest: Osborne, Athens 217; 
repeated provocations: [Dem.] 53.14–18; urged by others: [Dem.] 59.12. 
Cf. Cohen, Law, Violence 103–104, and Allen’s remarks (World of Prometheus 
162 ff.) on the sycophant’s inappropriate “economy of spending” anger. 
92 Contrary: cf. Dem. 18.277, 23.190; serving the common good: Antiph. 
6.9; Aeschin. 1.2; Dem. 22.1, 24.8, [59].12, 126 (a common motif ). 
93 Discussed by Rubinstein (in Cambridge Companion 129–145) and Christ 
(Litigious Athenian 148–159). Cf. Cohen, Law, Violence 85: “Athenian judicial 
orations … should not be read as repositories of moral verities about 
enmity, vengeance and the like, but rather as a record of the ongoing 
discursive construction of those values through the interpretative and 
manipulative practices of forensic rhetoric” (cf. 105 ff.). 
94 Osborne, Athens 216; cf. Harvey, in Nomos 112 and n.33. 
95 Cf. Lys. 4.13: “they want no money, but eagerly seek to deprive one of 
his homeland”—of the speaker’s enemies and adversaries.  
96 Unsurprisingly this is the charge leveled at prosecutors whose enmity is 
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this, the vindictive prosecutor risked not only the case he pled, 
but may have also faced a heavy fine, partial disenfranchise-
ment97 and subsequent liability to the procedures against syco-
phancy.98 
According to Harris the existence of these punitive measures 
provides the crowning proof that the Athenian courts “were 
not designed to be just another arena for citizens to pursue 
private feuds or to harass their enemies with suits lacking any 
legal merit.”99 Though the second part of this assertion can 
hardly be contested, the first seems far less plausible. Indeed 
when faced with an entire sequence of penalties for frivolous 
litigation, a would-be vindictive prosecutor might have thought 
twice before taking his chances with a trumped-up lawsuit. It 
does not necessarily mean, however, that he would forego the 
pursuit of his private feud when an opportunity to harass his 
enemy on a better case presented itself.100 This in fact the team 
Diodorus/Euctemon did twice:101 
___ 
produced as a negative: Lys. 7.30, 38; 9.7, 10; 21.17; cf. Lyc. 1.5–6; Dem. 
23.190 (both prosecution speeches); Dem. 18.123, 141, 143 (of a protest in 
the Assembly). An example of such double construction of this topos may 
have been the case Euctemon vs. Androtion (Dem. 22): the prosecution 
advances (proper) enmity as a respectable motive, whereas the defense, ar-
guably, attempted to produce it as a negative (22.59). 
97 If the prosecution failed to secure one-fifth of the jury’s votes; exempt 
from this were eisangeliai and perhaps euthynai and dokimasiai (but not doki-
masia rhētorōn). Somewhere after 333 the fine of 1000 drachmas was intro-
duced for failed or dropped eisangeliai; no form of partial atimia, however, is 
mentioned here, cf. Hansen, Eisangelia 29 ff.; MacDowell, Law 64. 
98 For the association of decisive failure in court and sycophancy see e.g. 
Dem. 25.83, Hyp. 3.34; cf. Harvey, in Nomos 106; Christ, Litigious Athenian 
64. Numerous procedures were available here (testimony to Osborne’s 
thesis on the flexibility of Athenian law: Athens 171–204): graphē, probolē, 
eisangelia (Isoc. 15.313–314; Ath.Pol. 43.5, 59.3), perhaps also endeixis, apagōgē, 
and phasis. 
99 Harris, Democracy 405, cf. 418. 
100 “Fortunate indeed was the man who could catch his enemy in a 
breach of the law”: Bonner, Lawyers 62. 
101 Dem. 24.8: ἰδὼν δ᾿ ἠδικηκότα κοινῇ πᾶσαν τὴν πόλιν … ἦλθον ἐπ᾿ 
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Having noticed (ἰδών) that he [Androtion] has committed a crime 
against the entire polis at large … I have moved against him 
with Euctemon, considering it a good opportunity simul-
taneously to help the polis and to take revenge (τιµωρίαν … 
λαβεῖν) for what I have suffered. 
Others did not even content themselves with simply waiting 
for their foes’ false step. As Epichares sincerely admits, he had 
done “extensive research” into Theocrines’ activities until he 
“found” a good case to bring him to court—and to get his 
revenge.102 All this is of course rhetoric. We do not know if in-
deed these two cases were as good as the speakers would have 
us believe. It does, however, show that in the public discourse 
of classical Athens vindictive and frivolous prosecution were 
quite distinct phenomena, overlapping only to a certain degree, 
which, in turn, proves that the penalties against the latter could 
only to a limited extent appear as set against the former. 
Conclusion 
We have no reason to believe that classical Athens was a 
society in which revenge by whatever means was an absolute 
moral imperative, nor even that, in terms of rhetoric, it was the 
magic wand dispelling the suspicions and anxieties—conceptu-
alized as ‘sycophancy’—surrounding the institution of volun-
teer prosecution. There is, however, sufficient evidence that 
properly constructed prosecutorial vindictiveness could be ad-
vanced as a respectable motive for undertaking public litigation 
and this also on behalf of the entire community. Recent at-
tempts to do away with this phenomenon, by playing down its 
significance or by burying it beneath numerous ‘exceptions’, 
fail to persuade.  
All this, however, need not be taken as an attempt to ques-
___ 
αὐτὸν µετ᾿ Εὐκτήµονος, ἡγούµενος ἁρµόττοντ᾿ εἰληφέναι καιρὸν τοῦ 
βοηθῆσαί θ᾿ ἅµα τῇ πόλει καὶ τιµωρίαν ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐπεπόνθειν λαβεῖν. 
102 “Extensive research,” τὰ πλεῖστα ἐξητακέναι, [Dem.] 58.19 (V. 
Bers’s translation); “we found,” ηὑρίσκοµεν (58.5)—since he was aided in 
this and instigated by his father. 
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tion the validity of the rule of law model altogether. The 
problem lies in the attempt to map the legal system of classical 
Athens and its discourses on the notional grid of modern 
philosophy of law, where indeed revenge and the administra-
tion of justice are decidedly at odds with each other. Rule of 
law excludes revenge—or, if you will, feuding—on principle, 
and, according to some more traditional, evolutionary models, 
supersedes it as the society evolves. Faced with such an alter-
native on the one hand and with the contradictory evidence 
from the orators on the other, we are indeed bound to choose 
between the two mutually exclusive models of Athenian liti-
gation: feuding or the rule of law.103 
This fundamental, stark opposition, however, may have been 
wholly alien to the public discourse of classical Athens. Indeed 
in the orators revenge and rule of law are sometimes repre-
sented as antagonistic principles—with a positive emphasis on 
the latter, of course. More frequently, however, a very different 
picture presents itself, where, far from mutually exclusive, they 
are in fact seen as synergistic forces in the working of the legal 
system. Revenge, in other words, may have been sometimes 
constructed as opposed to law enforcement, but it was not so 
by definition. This is the very least one might expect of a legal 
discourse which did not even strictly distinguish revenge from 
punishment on the notional level.104 Perhaps in reality these 
 
103 Harris, in Symposion 2001 133–139, disputes the validity of the notion 
of feud in relation to the Athenian legal system and practice (contra Cohen, 
Law, Violence 87–118). This however unduly plays down the perpetuation of 
some conflicts and does not take into account the way conflict is constructed 
and perceived by the orators themselves. Demosthenes, for example, 
explicitly links his quarrel with Meidias with the troubled history of his 
litigation against his guardians, in which Medias’ brother, Thrasylochos, 
played a significant role (Dem. 21.77 ff.). 
104 See esp. L. Gernet, Recherches sur le developpement de la pensée juridique et 
morale en Grèce ancienne (Paris 1917) 97–178; cf. Allen, World of Prometheus 68–
72; S. Saïd, “La tragédie de la vengeance,” in R. Verdier et al. (eds.), La 
Vengeance. Etudes d’ethnologie, d’histoire et de philosophie IV (Paris 1981) 47–90; C. 
Milani, “Il lessico della vendetta e del perdono nel mondo classico,” in M. 
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two principles may have been more frequently at odds with one 
another. However, Athenian law and its discourses offered 
ample room for accommodating both, which in turn is in itself 
an illustration of its “intense otherness” when compared with 
the modern practice and philosophy of law.105 
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